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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utalt

AMY ELIZABETH McKEE
OSTLER GREENER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

CASE

vs.

NO. 7265

THOMAS IDCHARDSON GREENER
and JAMES AFTEN GREENER,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
XIII

THrE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECREE
AND SET APART AS THE SOLE AND SEPARATE
PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF OF THE
TOTAL FUND OF $19,879.31 WHICH WAS ON DEPOSIT IN THE JOINT ACCOUNTS OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND GREENER ON AND PRIOR TO DECEMBER 22,
1947.
Respondents take the position in their brief "that this is
a divorce case, and that the matters with respect to the
moneys on deposit in various banks involved in this litiga-
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tion is merely incidental to the main issue of divorce, and
that if this Court sustains the decree of the trial court no
further orders or decrees with respect to the money involved herein are necessary or proper, except that the same
be released to the defendants. It was upon this theory that
the case was tried to the court below .
"
(Br. 9-10).
Of course, it goes without sayi11g that if this Court
sustains the decree of the lower court this case is ended in
all respects. We do not believe, however, that the above
statement sets forth what counsel had in mind. We believe that what, in effect, they intended to say was that if
this. Court upheld the lower court in denying the plaintiff
a divorce, no further orders or decrees with respect to the
money involved could be made because the money question was merely incidental to the main issue of divorce and
consequently fails with the divorce. If this be counsels'
contention, then counsel are in error.
In the first place, counsel know full well that it was
plaintiff's contention in the lower court that regardless of
whether a divorce was granted, plaintiff was entitled to
recover her one-half share of the joint accounts, and whatever ·part of the balance to which she may be entitled by
reason of her marital rights. It has always been - and
now is- plaintiff's contention that Greener had no right,
under any circumstances, to give away the plaintiff's share
of the joint funds and that having done so plaintiff may
follow such funds and recover them. In re Sutter, 245 N.
Y. S. 636; O'Connor v. Dunnigan, 143 N.Y. S. 373 (affirmed
without opinion, 213 N. Y. 676, 107 N. E. 1082); in re Klenk,
150 N. Y. S. 365 (affirmed without opinion, 214 N. Y. 715,
108 N. E. 1098).
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In the Suttcer case the court distinguishes between cases
where the cotenant's act amounts merely to a severance
and cases where he wrongfully withdraws or. appropriates
more than half of the estate, saying:
"Some cotenancy, however, remains even after
such severance; and in this lies the difference between
a case of severance and one of destruction in which one
cotenant alone attempts to destroy every vestige of the
joint tenancy and also any further cotenancy whatsoever, by appropriating to himself alone not only his
own moiety, but also that of his cotenant as well. Such
attempt at utter destruction of all cotenancy in the
premises, being wholly unwarranted and ineffectual as
such, the rights of the cotenants are deemed to remain
as they were before such destructive attempt had been
made.''
In O'Connor v. Dunnigan, supra, where money was de-

posited in a bank in an account which read, "Payable to
[wife or husband]. Pay to either or the survivor of either"
the court held that the form of deposit indicated an intent
to create a joint ownership with the right of survivorship;
that it was immaterial whether the mof!ey originally came
from the husband or from the wife; and that while as between the bank and the wife, she had the right to withdraw
the money from the account, her withdrawal of the same
and placing it in an account in her individual name, in the
absence of, and so far as appeared, without the consent of
the husband, could not divest him of his joint ownership in
the property. The court said:
"It would be preposterous to claim that an appropriation of personal property by one joint owner
to his personal use could divest th~ interest of the other
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joint owner, or could in any waj' be presumed to have
been by the consent of his co-owner."
See also State v. Gralewski's Estate (Ore.) 159 P. 2d
211, where this question is discussed at length and cases
collected.
In our main brief we have shown that a joint tenancy
existed between plantiff and defendant in respect of the
funds on deposit in their joint names. If this be true, under
the provisions of Sec. 40-2-6 of the Utah Code Annotated
plaintiff can maintain suit against Greener for any right
growing out of the tenancy in the same manner and to the
same extent as if they were unmarried. With the funds
havingj been transferred by Greener to Aften, a suit in
equity by the plaintiff would lie against them to set aside
the conveyance and recover her share whether she also
sued for a divorce or not. Equity acts to prevent a multiplicity of suits and when once jurisdiction is obtained of a
controversy on any ground and for any purpose, it will
retain jurisdiction for the purpose of administering complete relief. Parascandolo v. Christensen (Nev.) 199 P. 2d
629.
While the pleadings of the plaintiff may be somewhat
inartistically drawn, they do show that plaintiff claims an
interest in the joint accounts and prays inter alia. that the
transfer of the funds from the joint accounts to Aften be
set aside to the extent of any and all interest of the plaintiff; that she be declared the absolute owner of one-half of
the funds and of such further sums to which she may be
entitled by reason of her marital rights. She also prays
for general relief (R, 41-42) .
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Respondents' counsel, throughout these proceedings
have, we admit, argued that whatever relief might be awarded the plaintiff was dependent upon a divorce being granted her. But to say that this was the theory upon which
the case was tried below is inaccurate and untrue, as the
pleadings show.
We, therefore, submit that under the law and the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover her moiety in the
funds that were in the joint account regardless of whether
or not she is entitled to a divorce, and that she is also entitled to have the remaining part of said funds subjected
to her right of support and other marital rights, including
her right of survivorship.

XIV
RESPONDENTS ARE BOUND ON APPEAL BY THE
THEORY OF- THE CASE ADOPTED BY THEM IN THE
LOWER COURT.
This Court has held many times that the theory of a
case assumed and acted upon by the parties in the lower
court must be adhered to on appeal. Aaron v. Holmes, 35
U. 49, 99 P. 450; Holman v. Christensen, 73 U. 389, 274 P.
457; Schuyler v. Southern Pacific Co., 37 U. 612, 109 P.
1025.
We invite the Court's attention to the joint answer of
the respondents and the cross complaint of the respondent
Greener. In the answer it is admitted that Greener transferred certain sums on deposit in various banks to Aften
(R, 106). No prayer for relief is made by Aften, but Green-
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er prays that the complaint be dismissed and that he, as
cross complainant, be awarded a decree of divorce. As
cross complainant, he also prays for general relief (R, 108).
On the hearings on order to show cause, both Greener
and Aften testified that the sums on deposit in the joint
accounts previously mentioned were given by Greener to
Aften as an outright gift (Tr. 196-197, 204-205, 210, 214215). At the trial on the merits Greener likewise so testified (Tr. 124, 128).
By what right, or under what theory, then, can respondents' present contention that Aften holds the money
in trust for Greener be sustained? The pleadings in this
case, even if examined microscopically, will fail to show
in the slightest degree any allegation to support such a result.
We sincerely submit that under the decisions of this
Court, Aften is not before the Court on this appeal, and
Greener is before the Court only on the question as to
whether the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce. Neither respondent, having testified below and taken the position that
outright gifts were made by Greener to Aften of the sums
involved, can now be heard to say that there was no gift,
and by such statement benefit Greener, to the detriment
of the plaintiff.

Respondents urge, apparently in their attempt to support the decision of the lower court, "that, in case general
relief only is asked, any relief that is supported by the
pleadings and the evidence may be granted, is well settled"
(Br. 34). Of course, we have no quarrel with this statement,
but we submit that it is of no benefit to the respondents, for,
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as we have pointed out, neither the pleadings nor the evidence supports the imposition of a trust in favor of Greener. In this regard, it is significant that respondents have
cited no authority that will support such result.

There are many statements in Respondents' Brief that
do not square with the testimony in this case. Some of
them will readily be identified by the Court, but we desire
to call attention to the following wholly-fallacious arguments:
( 1)

Counsel for respondents state that "Greener at
all times had exclusive control over the funds,"

that "at no time prio.r to the separation of the
parties in January, 1948, did the plaintiff make
any claim to said funds," and that plaintiff treated the funds "at all times as the sole property
of Greener" (Br. 24, 25).

On direct examination, Greener testified that he
couldn't eat or sleep, and that when he slept with plaintiff
he "laid all night wondering how in the devil I was going
to get out of that net she had me in" (Tr. 119). Later,
on cross examination, he described the "net" as being plaintiff's joint ownership with him of the funds, and testified
that he waited until plaintiff was in California to close out
the joint accounts because he "couldn't get away fron1 her
to do it," "didn't want her there when I did it," and "didn't
want her to know that I done it" (Tr. 139).
If it be true that plaintiff had no control over the funds,
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made no claim thereto, and treated the same as being
Greener's exclusive property, why was he so concerned
about the status of the joint accounts that he couldn't sleep?
Why was it necessary for him to delay closing said accounts
until he could do so without plaintiff's knowledge or interference? In the light of Greener's own testimony, there
is only one reasonable answer to those questions: He knew
that plaintiff was aware of her interest in those funds andeven though she was honest and made no attempt to take
them into her sole possession as she might have done, and
as he did-he also knew that she was determined to preserve the funds. He had given her to understand very definitely that she had an interest in them, at the very least
to the extent that they would be used "to keep her for the
rest of her days" (Tr. 6) and to assure her that "she would
never have to go on the old age pension" (Tr. 6, 102, 103,
106).
There is undisputed testimony that one of Greener's
sons had vowed that he would see to it that plaintiff "didn't
get a penny" of the money (Tr. 22). If it be true, as respondents' counsel have urged, that plaintiff had no control over and made no claim to the funds, but treated them
as belonging exclusively to Greener, there would have been
no reason for his son to be disturbed about the disposition
of the money.
As further evidence of plaintiff's interest in and claim
to the funds, we quote the following from Greener's testimony on cross examination (Tr. 134):
"When I moved those deposit books from one place
to another, she [plaintiff] was right on the job, she
was watching them books mighty close and she didn't
allow anything done with them."
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If the parties understood that the funds belonged ex-

clusively to Greener, why did plaintiff watch the books
"mighty close" and prevent anything being done with them?
The reasonable explanation of her interest is that she knew,
from the promises her husband had made, that she was a
present joint owner of the funds and that they did not belong exclusively to him. Hie also had the same understanding.
If, as is claimed, Greener placed plaintiff's name on the

accounts solely for the purpose of avoiding probate (Br. 28),
he should have had no problems. His alleged "exclusive
control over the funds," coupled with the asserted circumstance that plaintiff made no claim_ to said funds and
treated them at all times "as the sole property of Greener,"
should have relieved him of any feeling that he was caught
in a "net." He should have felt free to take the deposit
books to the banks, withdraw the funds, and deposit them
to his own account. He didn't do those things because he
did not have the exclusive control over the funds and he
knew that plaintit.l had a present interest in them.
Here is a man who, in the words of his own counsel,
through rigid economy
"during some 35 years
and scrupulous savings" (Br. 4) had accumulated a home,
some War Bonds and the funds with which we are now
concerned. If we are to believe his testimony, Greener
has taken from the banks and other institutions those hardearned funds over which he claims he had exclusive control and concerning which he asserts plaintiff had made no
claim, and given it all way, with the exception of "a few
coppers in my purse" (Tr. 126).
Are those the acts of a man who has sole and exclusive
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control over and right to property? We submit that they
are not!
The Court's attention is respectfully called to the several statements in Greener's testimony to the effect that
he intended that all of his property would go to plaintiff
upon his death (Tr. 122, 130, 141), and that it was his intention that plaintiff should have some of the money as
her own during her lifetime (Tr. 158-9).

( 2)

Respondents' counsel consider it significant that
plaintiff did not draw on the funds for her own
needs and to repay Greener the $2,000 received
by her at the time of the first divorce.

The court below has taken the position that, if plaintiff had known that the accounts were hers as much as
Greener's, she would have used them for her own purposes;
also, that instead of quarreling and bickering over the
$2,000 settlement in the first divorce, she would have repaid Greener that amount by drawing a check on one of
the joint accounts.
In their brief, respondents' counsel have adopted the
trial court's view and developed the theory that plaintiff's
failure to withdraw all or part of the money and use the
same for her own purposes constituted evidence that she
claimed no interest in the funds. They state that Greener
made and signed all checks and withdrawals from the accounts; that "although the passbooks were kept in the home
of plaintiff and Greener, plaintiff at no time made any attempt to take them into her possession" (Br. 25) ; and "that,
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although plaintiff had access to the passbooks, she "made
no attempt to withdraw any funds from these accounts,
but relied wholly upon what he was willing to give her"
(Br. 28). And then counsel reach the conclusion that those
facts constitute "clear and convincing proof sufficient to
overcome any presumption that might arise from placing
the plaintiff's name on the joint tenancy cards" (Br. 28).
We submit that it is not unusual for honorable joint
owners to have an interest in funds without threatening
to remove or actually removing them from the joint control. Our research on the. subject has disclosed no reported
case which would be authority for the proposition that the
test of ownership of joint accounts is "who got to the bank
first and withdrew the most." We are confident that this
Court will not be impressed by respondents' theory, but
will apply other and better-considered rules in determining
the question of ownership. If respondents' argument is
followed, it would be necessary for a joint owner to be fleet
of foot and immune to pangs of conscience in order to preserve his interest in property.
In connection with the return of the $2,000 paid plaintiff at the time of the first divorce, Greener's counsel argue·
that "had the parties considered the plaintiff as having any
present interest in said funds, it would have been quite unnecessary to quarrel about the return of any amount" (Br.
28-9). On the contrary, it appears to us that plaintiff's
present interest in the funds was the very reason for the
quarrels referred to. If she had no such interest, she might
have felt obligated to return the money.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we submit that the decision of the lower court should be reversed and judgment rendered in favor
of the appellant as set forth in her pleadings and in her
main brief herein.
Respectfully submitted,
S. E. BLACKHAM,
CLYDE D. SANDGREN,

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Received...__ __

copies of the foregoing Reply Brief

of Appellant, this ,_ _ _ _day of February, A. D. 1949.

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents.
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